"In two experiments, we find that non-binding talk of fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on competitive reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions."
These are Harvard Business School working papers. Any questions?
Addendum: If you want relevant academic work, read this:
does a history of playing an inefficient equilibrium make it harder for the players to reach the efficient equilibrium? In other words, can people 'get stuck' in bad equilibria? ... I implement randomized control to establish that precedent effects are important, but that natural occurring variation exaggerates the importance of precedent. I present evidence that some of the endogeneity of naturally occurring precedents is due to variation in risk-attitudes. This is because in the coordination games used, the inefficient equilibrium is associated with a safe strategy.Hear that water folks? Inefficient in the past is used today because it's "safe." [I know Omar, btw.]